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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1953, the Florida Legislature enacted section 542.33, a statute
governing contracts in restraint of trade.' This statute granted courts
authority to enforce an employee's covenant not to compete against a
former employer.2 Since the enactment of this statute, Florida courts
have generously enforced noncompetition agreements allowing employers to restrict competition by former employees in virtually all instances.3

*Iwould like to dedicate this note to my husband, Frank D. Wickes.
Editor'sNote: This note received the GertrudeBrick Law Review Apprentice Prize for Fall 1991.
1. Act of 1953, 1953 FLA. LAWS ch. 28048 (codified originally at FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1953),
codified as amended and renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1991)).

2. Id. The statute also covers covenants not to compete between sellers and buyers of
certain business interests, between independent contractors and their employers, between licensors and licensees, and between partners. See id. The scope of this note is limited to covenants
between employers and employees.
3. See Kendall B. Coffey, Noncompete Agreements by the Former Employee: A Florida
Law Survey and Analysis, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 727, 730 (1980) (noting that cases construing
the statute "have allowed few defenses, and have virtually mandated injunctive relief to remedy
violations"); Leonard K. Samuels, Florida's Amended Noncompetition Statute: A Reasonable
259
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Historically, section 542.33 has specifically granted Florida courts
the discretion to enforce such agreements by injunction. 4 The Florida
Legislature amended the provision, effective June 28, 1990, to clarify
the courts' discretion in this area.5 The amendment prohibits a court
from granting injunctions if a noncompetition agreement is (1) contrary
to the public health, safety, or welfare; (2) unreasonable; or (3) not
supported by a showing of irreparable injury.6 This amendment will
likely curtail the liberal enforcement of noncompetition agreements in
Florida,7 and will bring Florida in line with the majority of jurisdic8
tions.
This note will discuss the amendment's effect on noncompetition
agreements between employers and employees. In addition, this note
will examine Georgia's statutory ,olution to the problem of determining

Approach, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1991, at 60 (noting that "Florida has evolved into perhaps the
easiest forum in the nation in which to enforce noncompetition agreements").
4. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1989). Prior to the 1990 amendment, § 542.33(2)(a) provided:
One who sells the goodwill of a business ... and one who is employed as an agent,
independent contractor, or employee may agree with his employer, to refrain from
carrying on or engaging in a similar business and from soliciting old customers of
such employer within a reasonably limited time and area . . . so long as such
employer continues to carry on a like business therein. Said agreements may, in
the discretion of a court of competent jurisdiction, be enforced by injunction.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. Act effective June 28, 1990, 1990 FLA. LAWS ch. 90-216.
6. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1991). Specifically, the amendment added the following three
sentences to paragraph (2)(a) of the statute:
However, the court shall not enter an injunction contrary to the public health,
safety, or welfare or in any case where the injunction enforces an unreasonable
covenant not to compete or where there is no showing of irreparable injury. However, use of specific trade secrets, customers lists, or direct solicitation of existing
customers shall be presumed to be an irreparable injury and may be specifically
enjoined. In the event the seller of the goodwill of a business, or a shareholder
selling or otherwise disposing of all his shares in a corporation breaches an agreement to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business, irreparable
injury shall be presumed.
Id.
7. See Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127 (2d DCA) (outlining the amendment's
effect while reversing and remanding a trial court's decision to grant a temporary injunction in
favor of a former employer), rev. denied, 591 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1991); see also Samuels, supra
note 3, at 60 ("1990 amendment will preclude employers from enforcing noncompetition agreements with impunity"). For a discussion of the Hapney decision, see infra text accompanying
notes 70-96.
8. Under the amendment, Florida courts must consider the reasonableness of a covenant
not to compete as a whole before granting injunctive relief. A majority of states also apply
broad reasonableness tests to noncompetition agreements. See DONALD J. ASPELUND & CLARENCE

E.

ERIKSEN, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPEWITION LAW
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what is a "reasonable" noncompetition agreement. Lastly, this note

will discuss several recommendations for drafting documents under
the amendment.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Common Law

Covenants not to compete originated in the fifteenth century. 9 However, early English courts refused to enforce them, recognizing a

strong public policy against restraints on competition.1° This policy

developed in response to the labor shortage after the Black Death11
and the rise of craft guilds.12 Craft guilds prohibited a man from

working outside his apprenticed trade. 13 Therefore, any restraint deprived the apprentice of the right to earn a livelihood and deprived

the public of the fruits of the apprentice's labor. 4 These circumstances
15
compelled courts to hold all covenants not to compete void.
However, in light of the extraordinary rise in commerce during

the seventeenth century, courts changed this policy. Courts recognized
that parties entering agreements for the sales of businesses usually

possessed equal bargaining power, unlike parties in the master-apprentice relationship. 6 Courts presumed that the seller of a business could
subsist on the sale proceeds, even if the agreement restricted the

9. See ANTHONY C. VALIULIS, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: FORM, TACTICS, AND
THE LAW 156 (1985). The oldest known case dealing with a covenant not to compete is Dyer's

Case which was decided in 1414. Id. The plaintiff sued, claiming that the defendant, an employee,
violated a bond not to follow his trade anywhere in the plaintiffs town for a period of six
months. Id. The following statement by one of the judges in the case clearly reflects the policy
toward such agreements at that time: "By God, if the plaintiff were here he should go to prison
until he paid a fine to the King." Id.
10. Id. at 158; see, e.g., Colgate v. Bacheler, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (Q.B. 1602) (holding all
restraints on trade are void); Blacksmith of South-Mims, 74 Eng. Rep. 485 (C.P. 1587) (holding
covenants not to compete against the law and void).
11. VALIULIS, supra note 9, at 156. After the Black Death in 1348, the English government
enacted legislation which made unemployment a crime. Id. at 156-57. Thus, any restriction on
an individual's right to work was, in effect, aiding crime. Id. at 157.
12. Id. at 157. Although the guild system began to die out in the sixteenth century, legislation was passed in an attempt to revitalize it. Id. Thus, the public policy against restraints
on trade only increased. Id.
13. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio C.P. 1952) (presenting a detailed history of covenants not to compete beginning with early English common law).
14. Id.
15. VALIULIS, supra note 9, at 158.
16. Id. at 159.
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seller's ability to work. 17 Thus, the courts analyzed the reasonableness
of the restraint and upheld covenants in connection with the sale or
lease of a business provided the restraint was limited in scope. 18
By the eighteenth century, developments in technology improved
transportation and communication and increased the population's physical and economic mobility.19 Further, the industrial revolution
simplified work, resulting in decreased training time and the abolition
of apprenticeships. 20 These societal changes significantly lessened the
impact of restraints on competition and prompted English courts to
extend the reasonableness analysis to the employer-employee con21
text.
As early as 1711, courts recognized the conflicting policy ramifications of contractual restrictions on competition. In Mitchell v.
Reynolds,- Justice Parker (later Lord Macclesfield) stated that an
individual's right to work, the public's right to unrestrained competition, and the individual's right to contract all must be examined in
determining whether to enforce a noncompetition agreement.2 In an
attempt to reconcile the conflicting policies, Justice Parker distinguished between general and particular restraints of trade.- Justice
Parker declared general restraints, those extending throughout England, automatically void.? However, particular restraints, those limited to a particular place, were valid if supported by adequate consideration. 26 Justice Parker's reconciliation of competing policies eventually developed into a reasonableness test, which balanced the conflicting interests of the employer, the employee and the public.Y
In the early nineteenth century, American courts developed a
slightly modified version of the Mitchell rule, by upholding restraints

17. Id.
18. Id.; see, e.g., Broad v. Jollyfe, 79 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1620) (upholding agreement in
connection with defendant's sale of inventory to plaintiff that defendant would not compete in
a limited area); Rogers v. Parrey, 80 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1613) (upholding agreement in which
defendant promised the plaintiff that defendant would not pursue his trade in a particular shop
during the twenty-one year period that the shop was leased to plaintiff).

19.

VALIULIS,

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 160.
Id. at 159-61.
24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
VALIULIS,

supra note 9, at 161.

supra note 9, at 164.
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that were limited in both time and area. 2s Initially, these courts characterized a restraint which covered an entire state as general.2 However,
the United States Supreme Court rejected that formulation as "too
narrow a view of the subject," recognizing that other factors may
affect the reasonableness of a geographic limitation ° Within a short
time, state courts also began to reject the general/particular distinction
and to adopt a rule of reason analysis.31
By the end of the nineteenth century, American courts were using
a fact-based reasonableness test.s Although courts varied in their
exact statement of the test, they adopted the same basic analysis in
balancing the interests of the employer, the employee, and the public.3Additionally, all courts required that a covenant not to compete be
ancillary to an otherwise valid contract. 4 If the restraint's sole purpose
was to prevent competition, the restraint was not enforced.3s Today,
this fact-based reasonableness test remains the common law rule in
the United States. 6 Additionally, the states that have adopted statutes
governing covenants not to compete have incorporated some form of
this reasonableness test.3 7

28. Harlan Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 643-44
(1960); see, e.g., Pike v. Thomas, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 486 (1817); Pierce v. Woodward, 23 Mass. (6
Pick.) 206 (1828); Palmer v. Stebbins, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 188 (1825).
29. See Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 370, 375 (1866); Lawrence v. Kidder, 10
Barb. 641, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851); Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467, 470 (1866).
30. Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 67 (1873).
31. See Blake, supra note 28, at 644 (citing cases in New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island). Professor Blake noted that the rule of reason analysis was firmly established within 50
years of the first American decision in a restraint of trade case. Id.
32. VALIULIS, supra note 9, at 164-66.
33. Compare Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 289 S.W. 295, 297-98 (Ky. 1926) (test
considers whether the restriction: (1) reasonably protects the employer; (2) unreasonably restrains the employee; (3) is reasonably related to business of the employer; (4) is reasonably
related to the territory covered by employer; and (5) is against public policy) with Milwaukee
Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 246 N.W. 567, 569 (Wis. 1933) (test considers: (1) the business
interest of the employer; (2) the interest of the employee; and (3) the public interest).
34. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 288-91 (6th Cir. 1898), modified,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
35. Id.
36. VALIULIS, supra note 9, at 165.
37. See, e.g., ALA CODE § 8-1-1 (1984); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602 (West
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4 (1985); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23.921 (West Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. 88 28-2-703 to -705 (1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217-19 (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV.
STAT. § 653.295 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LA,VS ANN. 88 53-9-8 to -11 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.465 (West 1988).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 44

The Enactment of the Statute

Prior to 1953, Florida courts applied the basic common law rule,
considering equitable issues of fairness and reasonableness in determining the validity of covenants riot to compete. Florida courts shared
the common law concern that noncompetition covenants left people
unable to work, perhaps forcing them to become public charges.3 9
Furthermore, these courts recognized that employment contract terms
were often dictated by the employer.40 Thus, Florida courts favored
employees exclusively, as evidenced by the fact that before 1953 no
Florida court had enforced a noncompetition agreement against an
41
employee.
This situation left employers unable to protect their business goodwill and other interests.42 Noncompetition agreements were often the
only feasible device available to limit unfair competition by former
employees. 43 Responding to employers' needs, the Florida Legislature
enacted section 542.12 in 1953." The renumbered statute, prior to the
1990 amendment, provided in pertinent part:
Contracts in restraint of trade valid
(1) Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter to
the contrary, each contract by which any person is restrained
from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind, as provided by subsections (2) and (3) hereof, is
to that extent valid, and all other contracts in restraint of
trade are void.
(2)(a) One who sells the goodwill of a business, or any
shareholder of a corporation selling or otherwise disposing
of all of his shares in said corporation, may agree with the
buyer, and one who is employed as an agent, independent
contractor, or employee may agree with his employer, to
refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business
and from soliciting old customers of such employer within a
reasonably limited time and area, so long as the buyer or

38. See Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 So. 32, 36 (Fla. 1935) ("whether equity will lend
its arm to enforce the covenants of this contract by high writ of injunction must depend upon
whether or not the contract is so fair and reasonable as to commend itself to a court of equity").
39. Id. at 34.
40. Id. at 36.
41. Arond v. Grossman, 75 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1954).
42. See Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 1971).
43. Id.; see Coffey, supra note 3, at 728.
44. Flammer, 245 So. 2d at 857.
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any person deriving title to the goodwill from him, and so
long as such employer, continues to carry on a like business
therein. Said agreements may, in the discretion of a45 court
of competent jurisdiction, be enforced by injunction.
C. The Pre-Amendment Case Law
Since the statute was enacted, most Florida courts have vigorously
enforced noncompetition agreements." 6 In Atlas Travel Service, Inc.
v. Morelly,47 the Florida Supreme Court upheld a two-year covenant
not to compete recognizing that the statute "clearly supersedes the
common law rule."' Further, in Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 49 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
statute, rejecting a claim that the statute violated equal protection
by preventing the practice of a trade. 50 In Capelouto, the court
scrutinized a two-year noncompetition agreement between an exterminating company and its branch manager. The contract prohibited
the branch manager from competing in the area he managed. 51 The
court explained that such contracts would be enforced when they protected the legitimate business interests of the employer without harming the public and without inflicting an unduly harsh or oppressive
result on the employee. 52 The court held that, absent an overriding
public interest in the availability of the employee's services, the test
for enforcing covenants not to compete was reasonableness as to time

45.

FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1989). Section (2)(b) of the statute permits a licensee to agree

with a licensor to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business or from soliciting
old customers within a reasonably limited time and area. Licensor/licensee agreements may also

be enforced by injunction. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(b) (1989). Section (3) of the statute permits
partners, upon dissolution or in anticipation of dissolution, to agree that some or all will not
carry on a similar business within a reasonably limited time and area. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(3)
(1989).
46. See Coffey, supra note 3, at 729-30; Samuels, supra note 3, at 60.
47. 98 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957).
48. Id. at 818. In addition, the Atlas court noted that the statute's permissive language

stating that noncompetition agreements "may" in the "discretion" of the court "be enforced by
injunction" does not give the court absolute discretion. Id. Instead, the statute is construed as
requiring reasonable discretion so that the object of the statute is not nullified. Id.
49.

183 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1966).

50. Id. at 534. The court stated that the appellant offered no convincing authority supporting
his constitutional argument. Id.
51. Id. at 533.
52.

Id. at 534.
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and area. - Finding that the time and area provisions were reasonable,
the court affirmed the injunction.5
Later, in Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 56 the Florida Supreme
Court held that a noncompetition agreement containing unreasonable
time or area provisions could be modified by the court. 57 The Miller
court determined the reasonableness of the time and area provisions
by balancing "the employer's interest in preventing the competition
against the oppressive effect on the employee. '" After Miller, appellate courts repeatedly modified and upheld otherwise unenforceable
agreements. 59
More recently, courts have specifically limited their analysis to
6
determining the reasonableness of the time and area provisions. 0
These courts expressly did not consider the effect on the employee,
the type of interest protected by the employer, or any other equitable
considerations when deciding whether to grant or deny an injunction.61
Instead, these courts addressed equitable considerations only when
deciding the scope of the injunction.62
Thus, after section 542.33 was enacted, courts consistently favored
the employer who sought to prevent a former employee from compet-

53. Id.
54. Id. The covenant prohibited the employee, for a period of two years after leaving
employment, from competing in the area in which the employee had managed employer's business
and serviced its customers. Id.
55. Id.
56. 300 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974).
57. Id. at 12.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Marshall v. Gore, 506 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (modifying scope of
injunction to prohibit marketing of specific type of computer software instead of all computer
software); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. GirardE'au, 301 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (modifying
area to portion of city in which former employee had worked); Kenco Chem. & Mfg. Co. v.
Railey, 286 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (modifying area and reducing time limit from 5
years to 3 years); McQuown v. Lakeland Window Cleaning Co., 136 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA
1962) (affirming trial court's modification of time provision from 5 years to 1 year).
60. See Florida Pest Control & Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 520 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
(holding that if the time and area restrictions are reasonable, the court has no power but to
enforce the covenant); Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (3d DCA
1980) (stating that "[tihe only authority the court possesses over the terms of a non-competitive
agreement is to determine, as the statute provides, the reasonableness of its time and area
limitations"), rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1983).
61. See Twenty Four Collection, 389 So. 2d at 1063; see also Sarasota Beverage Co. v.
Johnson, 551 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (stating that an unduly harsh and oppressive
result to the employee is an insufficient reason not to enforce a covenant not to compete).
62. See, e.g., Sarasota Beverage Co., 551 So. 2d at 506 ("such a[n] [equitable] consideration
is relevant only when determining whether the covenant is reasonable as to time and area").
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ing. Cases interpreting the statute allowed few defenses and practically
guaranteed injunctive relief. In fact, in Capraro v. Lanier Business
Products, Inc.,63 the Florida Supreme Court held that irreparable
injury was presumed on breach of a valid covenant not to compete.6
The court emphasized that "immediate injunctive relief is the essence
of such suits and oftentimes the only effectual relief."- Thus, Florida
employers could enforce noncompetition agreements without showing
any actual or potential harm to their business interests.
Justice Overton filed a vigorous dissent in Capraro. He stressed
that the majority's holding was "contrary to basic equitable principles
and places the employee at a distinct disadvantage with his employer.N 6 He argued that former employees should not be restrained from
earning a living, especially nonmanagement employees, except when
absolutely necessary to stop irreparable harm.6 7 Furthermore, Justice
Overton urged the legislature to modify the statute to allow courts
to apply equitable principles when injunctive relief is sought.6 Apparently, the 1990 amendment to section 542.33 was a direct response to
Justice Overton's call.

III.

1990 AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTE

Effective June 28, 1990, the Florida Legislature added the following
three sentences to section 542.33(2)(a):
However, the court shall not enter an injunction contrary
to the public health, safety, or welfare or in any case where
the injunction enforces an unreasonable covenant not to compete or where there is no showing of irreparable injury.
However, the use of specific trade secrets, customer lists,
or direct solicitation of existing customers shall be presumed
to be an irreparable injury and may be specifically enjoined.
In the event the seller of the goodwill of a business, or a
shareholder selling or otherwise disposing of all of his shares
in a corporation breaches an agreement to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business, irreparable injury
shall be presumed.69

63. 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
64. Id. at 213.
65.

Id.

66. Id. at 214 (Overton, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
69. Act effective June 28, 1990, 1990 FLA. LAWS ch. 90-216 (codified at FLA.
542.33(2)(a) (1991)).
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Second District Interpretation

In Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 70 the Second District Court of
Appeal outlined its view of the effect of the amendment to section

542.33. However, before addressing the amendment, the Hapney court
discussed the pre-amendment state of the law.71 Specifically, the court
addressed whether judicial review under the original statute was limited to analyzing reasonableness in time and area without regard to
whether the covenant reasonably related to the protection of a legitimate business interest of the employer.7 2 Noting that no Florida court
had yet considered this issue, the court found that judicial review was
not so limited.7 3 The court held that an employer must plead and prove
a legitimate business interest in order to enforce a noncompetition
agreement.7 4
Hapney worked for various auto repair shops from 1981 until 1988
when he went to work for Gulfcoast.7 5 Hapney signed an employment

70. 579 So. 2d 127 (2d DCA), rev. denied, 591 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1991).
71. Id. at 129.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 131-34. However, the Hapney court stated that many prior decisions implied the
necessity of a legitimate interest. Id. at 131. Arguably, courts have always considered an
employer's legitimate business interests when determining the reasonableness of time and area
provisions in covenants not to compete. In Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, for example, the
Florida Supreme Court specifically stated that. in determining the reasonableness of time and
area provisions, the courts should weigh the employer's interest in preventing the competition
against the oppressive effect on the employee. 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974). In fact, the
requirement that noncompetition agreements be reasonable as to time and area implies the
necessity of a legitimate business interest. For example, in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Girardeau, the court restricted the geographic scope of a covenant not to compete to the area in
which the former employee had worked. 301 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). In doing so,
the court found the agreement's geographic scope reasonably related to the employer's legitimate
business interest, i.e., the employer's customer relationships. Without examining the business
interest that the employer seeks to protect, a court could not determine what time and area
provisions are reasonable.
74. Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 134. No previous appellate cases had mentioned an explicit
requirement that the employer plead and prove a legitimate business interest. In a strong
dissent, Justice Lehan criticized the majority for engaging in judicial activism when it imposed
this condition on the validity of noncompete agreements. Id. at 139 (Lehan, J., dissenting).
Justice Lehan argued that by requiring the employer to show a legitimate business interest,
the majority revoked the presumption of irreparable injury that previously had been available
to employers. Id. at 136 (Lehan, J., dissenting). He explained that by requiring an employer
to prove that the contract protected a particular kind of interest, the majority in effect required
the employer to prove injury from the breach of the contract. Id. at 137 (Lehan, J., dissenting).
"This will, I think, have the effect of turning the law in this area on its head." Id. (Lehan, J.,
dissenting).
75. Id. at 128.
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agreement with Gulfcoast which provided he would not offer, as an
agent, employee, owner, or distributor, similar products or services
on behalf of a competitor of Gulfcoast. 76 This agreement restricted
Hapney from competing on the west coast of Florida from Crystal
River to Naples and inland 100 miles.7 In 1989, Hapney started working for a competitor in the prohibited area. 78 In response, Gulfcoast
79
sued, and the trial court granted a temporary injunction.
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal vacated the temporary injunction.80 In doing so, the court emphasized that because
section 542.33 was in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly
construed.8' At common law, a covenant which prohibited competition
per se was void as against public policy.Y However, if the covenant
prohibited unfair competition through the use of trade secrets, confidential information, special relationships developed with customers,
or to protect another legitimate business interest, then the covenant
would be upheld.m The Hapney court read section 542.33 to indicate
that the legislature did not intend to abolish the common law requirement of a legitimate business interest.Y
The court then noted that Gulfcoast probably could not prove the
agreement protected a legitimate business interest.,, Hapney did not
have significant contact with customers, nor did he acquire any trade
secrets or other confidential information. 6 However, Gulfcoast did
provide Mr. Hapney with significant training in the installation of
cruise controls and cellular telephones." In light of these facts, the
court remanded the case, permitting Gulfcoast to argue that this train-

76. Id.
77. Id. Gulfcoast has facilities in Tampa, St. Petersburg, Sarasota, and Ft. Myers, and
draws customers from surrounding areas. Id.
78. Id. at 128-29.
79. Id. at 129.
80. Id. at 134.
81. Id. at 131.
82. Id. at 129.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court noted that no Florida decision had addressed whether an employer had
to show a legitimate business interest to be protected under the agreement. Id. at 130. The
court reviewed the law of other jurisdictions and concluded that the overwhelming majority did
not permit agreements that prohibited competition per se, but required that the contract relate
to the protection of a legitimate business interest. Id. Additionally, the court noted several
Florida decisions imply such a requirement. Id. at 131.
85. Id. at 134.
86. Id. at 129.
87.

Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

ing rose to the level of a legitimate business interest. The court
noted that for training to qualify as a protectible interest, the training
must be special or extraordinary, not merely the simple training
needed to perform a particular job. 89
Additionally, the court concluded that the 1990 amendment applied
retroactively and set forth the changes resulting from the amendment.90 The court outlined the "sweeping impact" of the amendment
as follows:
1. It strictly curtails the presumption of irreparable injury resulting
9
from a violation of a noncompete covenant, as permitted in Capraro.
1
2. A reasonableness test applies and the court may not enforce an
unreasonable covenant.2 Traditional equitable principles apply to avoid
9
unfair and unjust results. 3
3. Covenants protecting trade secrets and customer lists and prohibiting solicitation of customers receive special treatment under the
amendment.- In these cases, an employer who proves such a protectible interest is entitled to a presumption of irreparable injury.9 5 Thus,
while all employers must first prove the existence of a protectible
interest, the degree of proof required depends on the type of interest
protected.9
B.

Plain Language Interpretation

The Hapney court's interpretation of section 542.33 is consistent
with the amendment's plain language. The amendment clearly states
that the court will enter no injunctions under three circumstances: (1)
if contrary to the public health, safety, or welfare; (2) in any case
where the injunction enforces an unreasonable covenant not to compete; or (3) where there is no showing of irreparable injury.9 Although
the amendment specifies when injunctions will not be granted, it effectively establishes the following three requirements for obtaining an
injunction:

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

96.

Id.

97.

FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1991).

134.
132.
134.
133.

Id. at 134.
Id.
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1. Public Health, Safety, or Welfare. The injunction must not be
contrary to the public health, safety, or welfare. This requirement is
not new. Many cases prior to the amendment imposed this requirement, and many employees, especially doctors and other health care
workers, defended against injunctions on this ground.9 8
2. Reasonableness. The covenant not to compete must be reasonable. Before the amendment, courts held that if the time and area
provisions were reasonable, a court must enforce a covenant not to
compete even if enforcement was unduly harsh and oppressive to the
employee.9 The amendment's language, however, suggests a broader
reasonableness test now applies. This test allows consideration of all
aspects of the covenant, not just the time and area provisions. Hapney
instructs courts to apply traditional equitable principles to avoid unfair
and unjust results. 100 This will likely resurrect the common law reasonableness test, permitting courts to balance all interests and policies
in determining whether a covenant is reasonable.
By expanding the reasonableness inquiry, the amendment allows
courts much greater discretion to determine which covenants to enforce. Parties must prove the specific effects of enforcement or nonenforcement of the agreement and must show that equity is on their
side. Before the amendment, litigation focused on time and area provisions. After the amendment, the focus may be broader. Because the
reasonableness test is fact specific, there can be no exhaustive list of
factors that courts may consider.11 However, some factors are common.

98.

See, e.g., Lloyd Damsey, M.D., P.A. v. Mandowitz, 339 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)

(refusing to enforce restrictive covenant against employee surgeon in view of compelling need
for surgeon's services and fact that enforcement would jeopardize public health of community);
Hefelfinger v. David, 305 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (enforcing restrictive covenant against
employee pediatrician even though there was a need for pediatricians in the area because the

restraint would not harm the public health).
99. See, e.g., Florida Pest Control & Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 520 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA
1988); supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
100. Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 133 (2d DCA), rev. denied, 591 So.
2d 180 (Fla. 1991).
101. However, one author gathered a long list of factors that courts in other jurisdictions

have considered in the past when deciding the reasonableness of noncompetition agreements.
ASPELUND & ERIKSON, supra note 8, § 6.04. The factors listed include:
a. Ability to obtain other employment;
b. What ordinary person would anticipate;
c. Length of employment or association;
d. Expenses incurred by employer;
e. Nature of goods or services;
f.
Attorney advice;
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For example, courts have long considered an employee's ability to
obtain other employment. 10 2 Employees may now benefit by arguing
that finding non-competitive employment is difficult. Employees can
buttress this argument if they possessed significant experience in the

employer's field before working for employer. °3 However, courts will
probably not discard a covenant based on undue hardship alone.'1"

Instead, undue hardship may tip the balance in favor of
the employee
0 5

when the employer's need for protection is not great.'
Courts also consider an employer's offer to limit the noncompetition
agreement's effect. 0 6 Such an offer could minimize employee claims
that the restraint imposes undue hardship.' 07 Additionally, a court may
find a restraint more reasonable if the employee voluntarily left employment to enter competition rather than competing after being
fired. 108

g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
t.
u.
v.
w.
x.

Position as executive or professional;
Give and take negotiations;
Bargaining power;
Voluntary limitation of enforcement;
Pre-termination activities of employees;
Prior experience of employee;
Employee's choice to go into competition;
Misrepresentation or concealment by either party;
Employee's abilities;
Refusal or failure to sign all or portion of contract;
Intent of employer in bringing suit;
Intent of employee in entering competition;
Professional standards and customs;
Mitigation of damages including finding of substitutes;
Prior and mass departures;
Existence of trade secrets or confidential information;
Need to protect customers and/or goodwill; and
Time and area restrictions.

Id.
102. Id. § 6.04(3).
103. See Besso Chem., Inc. v. Schmidt, 522 F. Supp. 1087, 1091-92 (E.D. Ark. 1981)
(denying enforcement of noncompetition agreement and noting former employee had 11 years
of experience in the field prior to working for employer).
104. See ASPELUND & ERIKSON, supra note 8, § 6.04(36).
105. See id.
106. Id. § 6.04(13).
107. Id.
108. E.g., Vermont Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 315 A.2d 456, 458 (Vt. 1974) (noting a
further consideration that "this case deals with an employee who voluntarily left his employer
for the very purpose of going into business competitively in the same special field. He was not
placed in the double bind of being both fired and subject to five years of employment restraint.").
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3. IrreparableHarm. The employer must show irreparable harm.
Since 1986, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a mere violation
of a noncompetition agreement creates a presumption of irreparable
injury. 109 Under the amendment, however, the presumption only arises
where the employee uses trade secrets, uses customer lists, or directly
solicits existing customers. 110 Without the presumption, an employer
must prove irreparable harm in addition to the existence of a valid
contract, the employee's intentional and material breach of the contract, and the absence of any other form of relief.,

Finally, Hapney also requires a legitimate business interest as a
condition precedent for upholding a noncompetition agreement. 112 How-

ever, this requirement appears superfluous. Without a legitimate
reason for the agreement, such as protecting a business interest, the

109. Capraro v. Lanier Bus. Prods., Inc., 466 So. 2d 212, 213 (Fla. 1985).
110. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1991). Whether the presumption arising under the
statute is rebuttable or irrebuttable is unresolved. Recently, the Third District Court of Appeal
suggested that the presumption is irrebuttable. See Sun Elastic Corp. v. O.B. Industries, No.
91-2199, 1992 WL 123429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). In Sun Elastic, the court reversed the denial of
a temporary injunction, noting that it was admitted that the former employee directly solicited
existing customers of the former employer. Id. at *2-3. While acknowledging that the 1990
amendment to § 542.33 was intended to restrict the availability of injunctive relief, the court
stressed that the amendment provided that the presumption of irreparable injury was available
in this circumstance. Id. at *2. Therefore, the court found that "cases holding that a trial court
is required to enjoin the violation of a noncompetitive agreement which is reasonable as to its
duration and geographical limitation remain directly applicable and controlling." Id. (citations
omitted). The court remanded with directions to grant the temporary injunction. Id. at *3.
The majority in Sun Elasticdid not address whether the evidence presented by the employee
rebutted the presumption of irreparable injury. In a special concurrence, Judge Cope viewed
this as a suggestion by the majority that the presumption arising under the statute is irrebuttable.
Id. at *4 (Cope, J., specially concurring). Stating that there is no evidence that the legislature
intended for the presumption to be irrebuttable, Judge Cope pointed out that in certain circumstances, the solicitation of existing customers may not result in irreparable injury. See id.
(Cope, J., specially concurring). For instance, if there is a liquidated damages clause or if the
damages can be calculated, there would be no irreparable injury. See id. (Cope, J., specially
concurring).
In addition, Judge Cope emphasized that it was inappropriate for the majority to "exhume"
the Capraroline of cases which hold that a court must enjoin competition if irreparable injury
is presumed and the time and area restrictions of an agreement are reasonable. Id. at *5 (Cope,
J., specially concurring). Judge Cope stated that legislature specifically intended to overrule
Capraro and to adopt the rule of the Capraro dissent. Id. (Cope, J., specially concurring).
Therefore, Judge Cope suggests that a presumption of irreparable injury and reasonable time
and area restrictions do not mandate injunctive relief.
111. See Hunter v. North Am. Biologicals, Inc., 287 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
112. Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 134 (2d DCA), rev. denied, 591 So.
2d 180 (Fla. 1991).
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employer cannot suffer irreparable harm. Additionally, an agreement
without a legitimate end is unlikely to be reasonable. Thus, even
without independently requiring a legitimate business interest, evidence of legitimate business interests will be necessary to prove irreparable harm and reasonableness under the amendment.
C.

Retroactive or Prospective Application

Whether the broader reasonableness test and the burden of proving
irreparable harm apply to employers with covenants predating the
amendment depends on whether the amendment operates retroactively. If the amendment is retroactive, it will apply to any contract,
regardless of when it was entered. Conversely, if the amendment is
prospective, it will apply only to contracts entered after June 28, 1990,
the effective date of the statute.
Generally, statutes are applied prospectively unless their language
clearly shows legislative intent for retroactive application. 113 Further,
even clear legislative intent that a statute operate retroactively will
be ignored if the statute "impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties. ' 1114 However, if a statute is found to
be remedial in nature, the Florida Supreme Court directs that the
statute be retroactively applied to serve its intended purpose." 5 A
remedial statute changes a mode of procedure or a remedy, a remedy
being the means used to enforce a right or redress an injury.1 6 A
substantive change in a statute will not be applied retroactively, regardless of legislative intent.
The Hapney court held that the 1990 amendment to section 542.33
is remedial.1 7 The Hapney court observed that the amendment
"merely refines the relief available by categorizing the burden of proof
in relation to the protectible interest at issue, and clarifies that the
general principles of equity shall apply in this class of cases." l Therefore, the court held that underlying substantive rights were not affected by the amendment. "1 9
This holding is consistent with the amendment's plain language.
The amendment itself suggests its purpose is to limit the circumstances

113. Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1985).
114. Anderson v. Anderson, 468 So. 2d 528, 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
115. City of Orlando v. Desjardins, 493 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 1986).
116. St. Johns Village v. Department of State, 497 So. 2d 990, 993 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
117. Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d, 127, 134 (2d DCA), rev. denied, 591 So.
2d 180 (Fla. 1991).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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in which courts can grant injunctions. 120 An injunction is a remedy,
and the amendment alters the means of obtaining that remedy. In
this sense, the amendment is remedial. However, the amendment
could also be considered substantive. Before the amendment, the First
District Court of Appeal directed courts to enforce covenants not to
compete if the time and area provisions were reasonable, even if the
covenant was harsh and oppressive. 121 Arguably, the amendment's
expanded reasonableness requirement alters that decision. Under the
amendment, a harsh and oppressive covenant may not be enforceable
12
regardless of the reasonableness of the time and area provisions.
Thus, employers may not be able to enforce certain covenants under
the amendment that were enforceable before. For this reason, the
amendment arguably impairs an employer's substantive right to enforce certain covenants and should therefore only be applied prospectively.
Other Florida cases imply that a covenant's overall reasonableness
has been a consideration under the statute since its inception. As early
as 1966, the Florida Supreme Court held that noncompetition agreements would be enforced to protect the legitimate interests of the
employer without harming the public interest and without inflicting
an unduly harsh or oppressive result on the employee. 23 Therefore,
it appears that, long before the amendment, the Florida Supreme
Court could refuse to enforce harsh and oppressive covenants. This
supports the argument that the amendment does not alter substantive
rights, and leads to the Second District's conclusion that the amendment is merely remedial.
Finally, employers can argue that the amendment cannot be applied
retroactively because abolishing the presumption of irreparable injury
alters substantive rights. However, the Florida Supreme Court has
held that the burden of proof is a procedural issue, and that shifting
the burden of proof does not abrogate substantive rights. 124 Nonetheless, Justice Lehan argues in his Hapney dissent that the amendment

120. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1991) ("However, the court shall not grant an injunction.
121. Florida Pest Control & Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 520 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
122. See STAFF OF FLA. S. COaiI. ON JUDICIARY-CIV., CS FOR SB 2642 (1990) STAFF
ANALYSIS at 3 (May 17, 1990) (stating that "although courts currently examine covenants for
the purpose of assessing their reasonableness, the addition of language stating that the court
shall not enter an injunction which enforces an unreasonable covenant could result in the court's
reexamination of whether the covenant is 'burdensome').
123. Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 183 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1966).
124. Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239, 243 (Fla. 1977).
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does not alter the burden of proof because no burden previously
existed. 1 5 Therefore, the amendment imposes a new element of proof
and cannot be retroactively applied to pre-1990 contracts. 126 The validity of Justice Lehan's argument may depend on whether the presumption of irreparable injury available prior to the amendment is
characterized as conclusive or rebuttable. 27 At this time, the Florida
Supreme Court has not addressed that question.12
IV.

THE GEORGIA ACT

The amendment to section 542.33 requires a reversion to a common
law reasonableness inquiry. Prior to 1990, Georgia also applied the
common law to noncompetition agreements. 29 However, in 1990, the
Georgia Legislature passed a restrictive covenant act directed at the
problems caused by its courts' numerous and conflicting applications
of the common law.13° Georgia's experience shows the problems that
may result from a broad reasonableness inquiry and provides an example of one state's statutory solution.
Effective July 1, 1990, Georgia enacted a new restrictive covenant
act.'8 ' While the Act did not substantially alter preexisting common
law in Georgia, the Act did shift public policy to favor the use and
enforcement of noncompetition agreements. 3 2 Before the Act, Georgia
courts decided hundreds of cases using various unclear rules.'1 The

125. See Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 141 (2d DCA), rev. denied, 591
So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1991) (Lehan, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.; see supra note 110.
129. See, e.g., Barrett-Walls, Inc. v. T.V. Venture, Inc., 251 S.E.2d 558, 561 (Ga. 1979)
(stating that the rule of reason applies when reviewing covenants in restraint of trade).
130.

Act effective July 1, 1990, 1990 GA. LAWS 1676 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-8-2

to -2.1 (Supp. 1992)).
131. Id. For a discussion of this Act, see Peter C. Quittmeyer, Georgia's New Restrictive
Covenant Act, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1990).
132. See Quittmeyer, supra note 131, at 2. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1(a) (stating
that "[clontracts that restrain in a reasonable manner any party from exercising any trade...
shall not be considered against the policy of the law, and . . . shall be enforceable for all
purposes.") with Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 211 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Ga. 1975) (stating
"[c]ovenants not to compete ancillary to employment contracts must be scrutinized in terms of
the public policy generally disfavoring such contracts as restraints on trade and competition").
133. Quittmeyer, supra note 131, at 2. The accumulation of cases was so confusing and
voluminous that Justice Jordan of the Georgia Supreme Court stated, "[t]en Philadelphia lawyers
could not draft an employer-employee restrictive covenant agreement that would pass muster
under the recent ruling of this court." Fuller v. Kolb, 234 S.E.2d 517, 518 (Ga. 1977) (Jordan,
J., dissenting).
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primary purpose of the Act was to provide standards for determining
the validity of noncompetition agreements."M To accomplish that purpose, the Act identified the circumstances under which a covenant is
considered reasonable. 13 If a covenant is not considered reasonable
under the Act, then common law applies to determine if the covenant
is reasonable.136
To narrow its application, the Act defines "employee" to include
only executives, officers, managers, research and development personnel, and other persons possessing significant confidential information
or specialized skills. 137 This definition is based on the presumption that
these types of employees have more bargaining power than other
classes of employees.a Furthermore, the definition presupposes that
an employer of this type of employee is more likely to have a legitimate
business purpose for the noncompetition agreement.13 9 The definition
of "employee" specifically excludes any employee "who lacks selective
or specialized skills, learning, customer contacts, or abilities. '' 140
With regard to covenants that restrict competition, the Act requires a prohibited area be limited to the area where the employee
is working at the time of termination.14 ' The Act also requires that
prohibited activities bear a reasonable relation to the employee's previous activities performed for the employer."42 Additionally, there is
4
a rebuttable presumption that a two-year time limitation is valid.1 3
With regard to covenants that restrict solicitation of employer's
customers, the Act allows prohibition of both solicitation and acceptance of prior customers.- Also, the agreement need not specify a
prohibited area since the prohibition follows the prior customer. 45 The
Act restricts enforcement of these covenants by allowing the employer
to prohibit solicitation only of prior customers with whom the employee
had material contact.'4 6 Material contact includes direct business dealM

134. Quittmeyer, supra note 131, at 1.
135. See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1(a) (stating that contracts described in § 13-8-2.1(b)-(d)
are considered reasonable).
136. See id. § 13-8-2.1(a).
137. Id. § 13-8-2.1(c)(1)(B).
138. See Quittmeyer, supra note 131, at 10.
139. Id.
140. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1(c)(1)(B).
141.

Id. § 13-8-2.1(c)(2).

142. Id.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. § 13-8-2.1(c)(6).
Id. § 13-8-2.1(c)(3).
Id.
Id.
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ings, acquaintance through confidential information, and any connec47
tion resulting in sales commissions for the employee.'
Georgia's experience can be instructive in Florida in two ways.
First, the Georgia Legislature adopted the Act to remedy confusion
resulting from the hundreds of cases interpreting the reasonableness
requirement. Confusing and sometimes conflicting case law is not limited to Georgia. Florida courts are susceptible to the same problem
because a reasonableness inquiry necessarily involves a fact-specific
inquiry. Because an endless variety of factual situations will arise, an
endless variety of decisions will result.
Second, Georgia's Act restates basic common law principles of
reasonableness applied in Georgia before the Act's adoption. Florida's
amendment requires a reasonableness inquiry before injunctive relief
may be granted. Although Florida courts' interpretation of reasonableness will not necessarily match Georgia courts', Georgia's Act can still
be helpful. The Georgia Legislature sorted through its case law and
identified certain clearly reasonable restraints. These clearly reasonable restraints will likely be found reasonable in Florida. Thus, Georgia's Act provides a useful starting point for defining reasonable covenants in Florida.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR DRAFTING UNDER THE AMENDED STATUTE

In addition to developing factual arguments to prove reasonableness at trial, employers should modify the language of their noncompetition agreements to respond to the Florida amendment. The amendment has two effects. It opens up the reasonableness inquiry, and it
limits the use of the presumption of irreparable harm. Thus, the drafter's goal is twofold: (1) to show that the restraint is reasonable, and
(2) to facilitate proof of irreparable harm.
A.

Reasonableness

In his authoritative article on employee covenants not to compete,
Professor Blake recommends several ways to increase the probability
a court will find a noncompetition agreement reasonable. 48 He recommends that the employer emphasize the fairness and flexibility of the
company's procedures.149 These procedures may include a waiver provision allowing an employee to receive a waiver of the restraint under

147.

Id. § 13-8-2.1(c)(1)(D).

148.

Blake, supra note 28, at 687.

149.

Id. at 687-89.
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279

certain circumstances. 15° Also, since courts often consider whether the
restraint imposes hardship on'the employee, the employer should document the employee's ability to do other work. Thus, the contract
should incorporate the employee's resume by reference or list the
education and skills possessed by the employee. 15' In addition, the
employer should include a statement that the employee is able and
willing to move if compliance with the restraint so requires. 152 One
commentator suggests making the employee's ability to earn a livelihood without violating the restraint a material condition to the employment.1 0
Other commentators suggest that employers include an exit interview clause in their noncompetition agreements.-'4 This provision
would require the employee to notify the employer of the employee's
new employer and new job description.as In addition, the clause would
require the employee to schedule an exit interview before leaving
employment. 156 At the exit interview, the employer can accomplish several goals. First, the employer can remind the employee about the
covenant not to compete and discuss its terms and conditions in detail. 57 Second, the employer can inquire about the employee's plans
for future employment, specifically asking if the employee intends to
compete. 8 Third, the employer can ensure that the employee has
returned all confidential information by having the employee sign a
written acknowledgment to that effect. 59 Fourth, the employer can
obtain a written acknowledgment that the employee has not breached
the terms of the noncompetition agreement. 6° Lastly, if litigation en150. Id. at 688. An employer also might consider giving financial assistance to the employee
during the term of the restraint in the event the employee was unable to find non-competitive
employment. Id.
151. See id. at 689.
152. Id.
153. VALIULIS, supra note 9, at 52. Valiulis suggests the following clause be included in
an acknowledgment section of the agreement: "Employee further acknowledges that (1) in the
event his/her employment with employer [sic] terminates for any reason, he/she will be able to
earn a livelihood without violating the foregoing restriction and (2) his/her ability to earn a
livelihood without violating such restrictions is a material condition to his/her employment with
Employer." Id.
154. See id. at 61; Michael L. Agee, Covenants Not to Compete in Tennessee Employment
Contracts: Almost Everything You Wanted to Know But Were Afraid to Ask, 55 TENN. L.
REv. 341, 386 (1988).

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See VALIULIS, supra note 9, at 61; Agee, supra note 154, at 386.
Agee, supra note 154, at 386.
Id.
VALIULIS, supra note 9, at 61.
See id.
Id.
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sues, the exit interview provides important evidence that the employer
was willing to cooperate and communicate with the employee about
the restraint.

In addition to these tactics, employers must tightly draft agreements to limit the restraint to the minimum needed to protect the
employer's interests. 161 A contract prohibiting competition per se without explaining the need to do so may be unreasonable.162 Therefore,
the employer should relate the scope of the agreement to specific
business interests. Professor Blake emphasizes that employers should
alert the court to the confidential nature of the parties' relationship.'6
To do so, he recommends specifically including in the contract a description of the kinds of confidential information that the employer
makes available to a particular employee or a particular class of employees.16 Further, he suggests that employers should describe the
nature of the employee's relationship with customers. 165 With this information, an employer can show the employee's awareness that the
job placed the employee in a position of confidence.B.

IrreparableInjury

To obtain an injunction, an employer must prove that the breach
of the covenant caused irreparable injury.'6 A court may favor a
provision stating that certain violations constitute irreparable injury.

161. Id. at 47.
162. See id. According to Hapney, an agreement prohibiting competition per se is void as
against public policy. Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 134 (2d DCA), rev.
denied, 591 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1991).
163. Blake, supra note 28, at 689.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Additionally, the agreement can include an acknowledgment by the employee that
the covenant is necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interests. VALIULIS,
supra note 9, at 48. An example of a clause in which the employee acknowledges the confidential
relationship is:
Acknowledgments. Employer is in the business of steel manufacturing, warehousing, and processing, currently specializing in specialty steel products. Employee
acknowledges that: (1) Employer's products are highly specialized items; (2) the
identity and particular needs of Employer's customers are not generally known in
the steel industry; (3) Employer has a proprietary interest in the identity of its
customers and customer lists; and (4) documents and information regarding Employer's methods of production, sales, pricing, costs, and the specialized requirements
of Employer's customers are highly confidential and constitute trade secrets.
Id.

167.

See

FLA. STAT.

§ 542.33(2)(a) (1991).
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The amended statute presumes irreparable injury when the employee
uses trade secrets, customer lists or solicits the employer's customers.'6 Thus, the employer will probably not have to prove irreparable

harm in those cases. 169
However, if the employer wants to protect other interests under
the agreement, the agreement should provide that a violation impairing
those interests constitutes irreparable injury. For example, if an employer provides an employee with training or confidential information,
the contract should state thai the subsequent use of that training or
confidential information by the former employee irreparably injures
the employer. Thus, later proof of irreparable harm may not be necessary.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Florida case law after the enactment of the 1953' noncompetition
statute developed significant advantages for employers seeking to prohibit competition. Often, employers obtained relief without proving
irreparable harm, and courts granted injunctions without considering
the effect on the employee. Equitable considerations were addressed
only to determine whether any modification of the time and area
provisions was necessary.
The 1990 amendment limits these advantages. The amendment
restricts the presumption of irreparable injury, and courts will now
evaluate noncompetition cases in light of all relevant facts and circumstances. Furthermore, the amendment is, arguably, remedial in
nature since it merely alters the requirements for obtaining an injunction. Thus, the amendment may apply retroactively to contracts that
predate its effective date.
By limiting the advantages previously available to employers, the
amendment returns Florida law to its common law origin. At common
law, Florida courts stringently protected the right to work and the
right to economic freedom. The common law courts were extremely
reluctant to uphold contracts that limited a person's right to follow a
chosen calling and enforced such contracts only when "mutuality and
fairness were demonstrated beyond peradventure of doubt."'170
Under the original statute, the courts moved away from such
policies, liberally enforcing noncompetition agreements regardless of

168. Id.
169. The issue of proof depends on whether the presumption is rebuttable or irrebuttable.
See supra note 110.
170. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 1971).
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the effect on the employee. The amendment restores the fairness
analysis. Georgia's experience, however, instructs that a "fair" approach may be a~t the cost of consistency in the case law. Hopefully,
Florida courts will apply the amendment to achieve the appropriate
balance among the conflicting policies involved, including the right to
contract freely, the right to work, the right to economic freedom, and
the right to unfettered competition.
Leslie A. Wickes
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